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TOWARD EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E): INVIGORATING A
POWERFUL BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION
Uriel Rabinovitz*
This Note explores how bankruptcy courts have analyzed and appliedthe
11 US.C. § 522(d)(11)(E) bankruptcy exemption and the confusion
generated by its conflicting interpretations. This Note reviews and
scrutinizes the history of the Bankruptcy Law, its goals and purposes, the
differences between its underlying themes, and specific mechanisms
involved in the implementation of bankruptcy exemptions. With a broader
understandingof the rationale behind bankruptcy laws in combination with
the relevant legislative history, this Note sets the stage and advocatesfor an
increased consistency in the analysis and application of the 11 US.C.
§ 522(d)(11) (E)exemption.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a hard working American Joe the Steelworker, legally blind in
one eye, who tries to support his family through his hourly wage job, but
falls behind on his debts due to the lasting economic turmoil. Sadly, he
further loses his vision in his only good eye in an accident involving
negligent handling of equipment by a construction worker. His visual
handicap interferes with his ability to provide for his family, and, needless
to say, for this family a bad financial situation takes a turn for the worse.
After consulting an attorney friend, this industrious American realizes that
his only financial option is to file for bankruptcy protection.
Concomitantly, in an attempt to save on legal fees and shorten potentially
lengthy legal proceedings related to his injury, he decides to forgo a full
trial and settle with the construction worker's company for a lump sum
payment of $120,000. The combination of bankruptcy filing and a
monetary settlement to compensate for Joe the Steelworker's injury raises
new legal uncertainties: Will the settlement be paid directly to the
bankruptcy trustee to repay creditors, or can the debtor retain some of these
funds? How can the Bankruptcy Code be utilized to help such a
beleaguered individual and his dependents? What issues should his lawyer
be aware of in order to help him get a much needed fresh start? This Note
provides an in-depth analysis of the contradictory rulings of various courts
in cases that raise similar questions and proposes resolutions that are in line
with the overall objectives of the Bankruptcy Law.
When filing a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor has
multiple avenues available to him depending on the specific circumstances
of the case. The most commonly utilized avenues are Chapters 7, 11, or
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13.1 In a Chapter 7 proceeding, assets are generally liquidated in exchange
for a release from debt, while debtors are permitted to retain a limited
amount of property. 2 In a Chapter 11 proceeding, assets are reorganized in
order to repay the creditors, while the debtor is allowed to retain a
significant part of the assets. 3 A Chapter 13 proceeding allows the debtor to
future income to effectively repurchase some
avoid liquidation by using his
4
of his nonexempt property.
The common thread shared by all of the aforementioned proceedings is
the creation of an estate by the actual filing for bankruptcy, regardless of the
avenue chosen by the debtor. 5 In principle, such an estate is "a legal fiction
in which property and property rights that were previously the debtor's...
are deemed held for the purpose of bankruptcy administration." 6 The
current Bankruptcy Law includes a provision for a discharge of debts,
which releases the debtor from personal liability for most types of debts that
existed prior to the bankruptcy commencement date. 7 The discharge
prohibits a creditor from exercising any form of collection action on
discharged debts. 8 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code allows for certain
property exemptions. 9 An exempt property is not a part of the bankruptcy
estate, and will not be liquidated.
This Note focuses on the 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(l 1)(E) exemption, which
allows a debtor to retain "a payment in compensation of loss of future
earnings ... to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the debtor." 10 Although at first glance this statute
appears straightforward, an in-depth examination of the term "future
earnings" reveals its ambiguity. The language of this statute leaves
significant latitude for interpretation by courts regarding the explication of
the term "future earnings" and the methods used to determine the size and
duration of compensation.
The primary purpose of this Note is to study the discrepancies created by
diverse interpretations of the § 522(d)( 11)(E) exemption by different courts,
and to further promote a more consistent and equitable implementation
approach for this exemption. To that end, this Note focuses its analysis on
the historic progression of the Bankruptcy Law, its underlying logic, and
1. See JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 415 (2d ed.
2007).

2. See generally id (explaining the various options available to a debtor when
approaching bankruptcy).
3. See MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 307 (1995).
4. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 641.
5. GEORGE W. KUNEY, MASTERING BANKRUPTCY 36 (2008). The exempt property is not

part of the bankruptcy estate; it is not subject to seizure by unsecured creditors and, thus,
would not be liquidated. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006); HERBERT, supra note 3, at 185.
6. KUNEY, supra note 5, at 36.
7. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 465; John C. McCoid II, Discharge: The
Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 164 (1996).
8. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 465.
9. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522.
10. Id. § 522(d)(11)(E).
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conflicting interpretations of the ambiguous language of the §
522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption.
Part I reviews the historical evolution of bankruptcy laws from the early
period of the Roman Empire to the enactment of the current U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. It further surveys and analyzes the major policy reasons
and purposes behind the protection provided by the Bankruptcy Code.
Subsequently, Part I describes and assesses the bankruptcy exemptions and
the confusion involving the use of the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption. Part II
explores conflicts among courts pertaining to specific mechanisms involved
in the application of the statute. Part III proposes a significant liberalization
in the courts' approach toward the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption that is rooted
in the historic development, principles, and rationale of the Bankruptcy
Code.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW: HISTORY AND PURPOSES

This Part introduces the Bankruptcy Law and describes its historical
progress and transformation from its earliest inception to its current form.
It then focuses on five policy reasons that establish the underlying rationale
for the various components of this law and further assesses the reasoning
and the mechanisms involved in the implementation of the bankruptcy
exemptions, particularly 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)( 1l)(D) and (E).
A. The Bankruptcy Law and the Dischargeof Debts: Centuries in the
Making
1. The Early Years
The civil regulation of commerce has always required the development of
rules and laws for dealing with failed businesses or businesspeople-the
primary ground for bankruptcy. "1Multiple theories have been proposed for
the origin of the term "bankruptcy." According to many scholars, it is
derived from a medieval Italian phrase indicating a merchant's "broken
bench."' 12 During that period, merchants sold their commodities from
benches, and when a merchant failed to make good on his debt, the
creditors assumed possession of his goods and broke his bench to prevent
its reopening. 13 Others have suggested that "bankruptcy" is rooted in the
French words banque, a bench, and route, a trace, implying that the
removal of the bench leaves behind only a trace. 14 It has also been
acknowledged that it may relate to the German word bank, which refers to a

11. See KUNEY, supra note 5, at 3.
12. Id.; Sandor E. Schick, Globalization,Bankruptcy and the Myth of the Broken Bench,
80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 219, 221 (2006).
13. KUNEY, supra note 5,at 3.

14. See F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 11 (William S. Hein &
Co., Inc. 2002) (1919).
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joint stock fund, or that it could have been used figuratively, just as today
5
an insolvent person is described as "broke."'
Under the Jewish law, as described in the Bible, 16 a debtor had a moral
obligation to repay his debt and might even sell himself into servitude to
achieve that goal. 17 Yet, after six years he would be freed and all debt
obligations would automatically be discharged. 18 Jewish law emphasizes
the importance of an eventual debt discharge. In contrast, under the early
Hammurabi's Code, a debtor was expected to pay his debts under all
circumstances. 19 The creditor could imprison a debtor until the debt was
repaid in full, or, alternatively, the impoverished debtor could sell himself
20
or his family into slavery.
In ancient Indian and Irish societies, an unpaid creditor would be allowed
to seat himself, often fasting, at the debtor's doorstep, to generate social
pressure and hostility toward the debtor. 2 1 Under the Twelve Tables of the
Roman Republic (circa 450 BCE), the debtor served as collateral for his
debt and could be imprisoned and ransomed upon default. 22 When multiple
creditors came forward, they were allowed to literally divide the debtor,
each taking a portion of his flesh to pay off the debt. 23 Later Roman laws
curtailed such acts and gave the creditors the right to seize and liquidate the
debtor's property instead of his physical existence. 24 In thirteenth-century
England, the Statute of Merchants authorized an immediate imprisonment
of any debtor who defaulted. 25 If the debt was not paid in full after three
months of imprisonment, the debtor's property and land would be delivered
to his creditors until the debt was paid off from the profits while the debtor
26
was locked up in prison.
For centuries, a "hapless debtor... has been chastised and blamed,
beaten and maimed, shunned by society, sold into slavery, and even put to
15. See id.
16. See generally Exodus 21.
17. KUNEY, supra note 5, at4.
18. Id. It should be noted that until the seventh year that frees the servant there is no
semblance to a discharge unless the entire debt is satisfied. NOEL, supra note 14, at 14.
According to the Talmud (a central text of mainstream Judaism discussing Jewish Law),
even the specific hour that a loan took place was marked on a bond document to allow for an
exact reference in prioritizing the creditors. Id.
19. See KUNEY, supra note 5, at 4.
20. See id. at 3-4; Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA.
L. REV. 223, 230 (1918).
21. See Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REv. 121, 135
(2004).
22. KUNEY, supra note 5, at 4; Levinthal, supra note 20, at 23 1.
23. See KUNEY, supra note 5, at 4; Levinthal, supra note 20, at 231.
24. See KUNEY, supra note 5, at 4.
25. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-And a Modest
Proposal To Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 811 (1983);
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 7 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws].
26. See Countryman, supra note 25, at 811; Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws,
supra note 25, at 7 (explaining that it was common practice to imprison debtors for not
paying their debts).
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death." 2 7 However, this perception has been radically altered, and
"[p]erhaps no process has undergone such a fundamental change over the
course of history than the method in which economic failure is addressed by
'28
society."
2. Bankruptcy: Coming to America
A significant portion of the U.S. law, including the original Bankruptcy
Law, is based on the English common law. 29 The history of U.S.
bankruptcy can be traced back to 1542, when the first bankruptcy law was
passed in England 30 providing a "collective remedy that tried to deal fairly
with a multiplicity of creditors." 31 It originated as a pro-creditor law at its
core. 32 Indeed, in the subsequent century many statutes were passed with
the underlying objectives of benefiting the creditors and penalizing the
noncompliant debtors. 33 Only significantly later, in 1705, was a pro-debtor
concept of debt discharge introduced. 34 From a humane perspective, the
advent of the discharge is viewed as a turning point in the evolution of U.S.
bankruptcy law: it ushered in the historical "transformation of bankruptcy
from a creditors' collection remedy to a system of statutorily mandated
composition mutually beneficial to debtors and creditors." 35 Interestingly,
the discharge was originally intended to serve the creditors, as the debtor
had to voluntarily surrender assets and give a full financial disclosure,
thereby facilitating the creditors' ability to collect. 36 However, some of the
brutality incorporated in the old laws remained, including the option of
capital punishment for noncooperating debtors. 3 7 William Blackstone
described the English bankruptcy laws of the time as "calculated for the
27. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a
Viable Optionfor DistressedBusinessesfor the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J.
153, 153 (2004).

28. Id.
29. Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supranote 25, at 7-10.
30. See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW:

PRINCIPLES,

POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 57 (2003); Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at
7.
31. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 57 (emphasis omitted). Under this law the

debtor was treated like a common criminal; he could not receive a discharge, nor could he
file for bankruptcy, as any proceeding had to be commenced by the creditor, and only
merchant debtors could enter bankruptcy. Id. at 57-58.
32. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 331-32 (1991) [hereinafter Tabb, The Historical Evolution]; Tabb,
History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 7-9.

33. See Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 331-32.
34. Id. at 333.
35. See McCoid, supra note 7, at 192.
36. See Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 333-34; see also infra Part
I.B. 1.
37. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 58; see also Tabb, The Historical
Evolution, supra note 32, at 333 (explaining that while this law marked the evolution of
more humane treatment of distressed debtors, the statute itself was intended to alleviate
concerns for the creditors' welfare, despite the fact that it granted debtors only a limited
benefit).
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benefit of trade, and founded on the principles of humanity as well as
38
justice."
There were two important limitations on the first discharge law. 39 The
eligibility was restricted to traders, whereas an insolvent nontrader could
not receive a discharge. 40 Additionally, bankruptcy was an involuntary
remedy. 4 1 Thus, in contrast to the current bankruptcy laws that allow a
debtor to simply file for bankruptcy and receive a discharge, under the 1705
law only creditors could put a debtor in bankruptcy. 42 These limitations
demonstrate that during the early years of the eighteenth century a lack of
sympathy toward debtors prevailed, although some scholars do
acknowledge that concerns for an honest debtor were also calculated in the
43
passage of the 1705 Act.

The importance of bankruptcy laws was not lost upon the drafters of the
U.S. Constitution. 44 The Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress to pass
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." 4 5 James Madison
described the underlying purpose and the necessity for such a clause, stating
that the formation of "uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many
frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into
that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into
different states
46
question."
Yet, the bankruptcy laws of the late eighteenth century were still
conceptually distinct from those of our modern era. 4 7 The historical
38. See Graydon S. Staring, Bankruptcy-An Historical View, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1157,
1159 (1985) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *472).
39. See Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 334.
40. See id. at 334-35.
41. Id.at 336.
42. See id The prevailing view was that credit was unjustified and linked with fraud. Id.
at 335-36.
43. See id.at 338 (explaining that Blackstone and others "unmistakenly identified
concern for the honest debtor as one of the bases upon which the bankruptcy acts rested."
(citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *472)).

44. See Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 13.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.4. This gave Congress a significant scope of power. See
Engstrom v. De Vos, 81 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Wash. 1949) ("The only restrictions on the
plenary, constitutionally conferred bankruptcy power of Congress are those to be found in
other provisions of the Constitution."). The Bankruptcy Code both incorporates and
overrules state laws. For an analysis of the federalism of bankruptcy, see generally Thomas
E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism,71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1063 (2002).
46. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 58 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James

Madison)); see also In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 496 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673)
("It cannot be doubted, that [C]ongress, in passing laws on the subject of bankruptcies, is not
restricted to laws with such scope only as the English bankruptcy laws had when the
constitution was adopted.... The power given must, indeed, be held to be general, unlimited
and unrestricted over the subject.").
47. See Staring, supra note 38, at 1157 (explaining that the "present bankruptcy law of
the United States has a scope undreamed of when the bankruptcy power was written into the
United States Constitution"); see also Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 325
(explaining that the present form of discharge in the United States did not exist until the
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transition in the fundamentals of the bankruptcy laws is depicted in the
following scholar's note:
In America, bankruptcy law has generally progressed from
conservative, creditor-oriented laws to more liberal, debtor-oriented forms
of relief. As late as 1785, debtors in Pennsylvania were subject to public
flogging and loss of an ear, and New York debtors could be branded with
a "T," which marked them as a thief. The modem Bankruptcy Code is far
more forgiving, representing a distinct chanige in society's opinion of debt
and the acceptance
that the risk of debtor non-payment is best borne by
48
creditors.
The progression of U.S. bankruptcy law itself was a slow process, and a
permanent bankruptcy law was not enacted until 1898. 49 At the onset, after
the ratification of the Constitution, the bankruptcy power stood unexercised,
despite the financial turmoil of 1792 and 1797 and the consequent
imprisonment of thousands of debtors. 50 Initially, a federal bankruptcy law
existed in distinct periods varying from a few years to two decades (from
1800 to 1803, 1841 to 1843, and from 1867 to 1878).51 "Federal
bankruptcy legislation was viewed as a temporary and emergency measure,
52
only appropriate to deal with the aftermath of economic depression."
The first bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,53 was almost
54
identical to the English law, allowing only creditors to file for bankruptcy.
Under this law, the discharge was solely available to merchants with
stipulation of their cooperation, 55 and was contingent on the approval of at
least two-thirds of the creditors. 56 Furthermore, the bankrupt debtor was
allowed only limited exemptions 57 for the "necessary wearing apparel" and
beginning of the twentieth century, and even today many civilized countries still do not offer
an overburdened debtor the possibility of discharge).
48. KuNEY, supra note 5,at 4.
49. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 58; see also Countryman, supra note 25, at
814 (explaining that imprisonment for debt was widely used in the United States in the early
nineteenth century, as evidenced by the fact that in Massachusetts, Maryland, New York,
and Pennsylvania there were three to five times more individuals incarcerated for debts than
for crimes).
50. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution, supra note 32, at 344; see also FERRIELL &
JANGER, supra note 1, at 135 (proving that the bankruptcy power was "largely dormant
through[out] most of the nineteenth century").
51. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 58. Each of these laws was passed in
response to a major financial crisis. Id.
52. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 135-36.
53. ch. 19, 1 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
54. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 58; Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws,
supra note 25, at 14-15.
55. See Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 14-15; Charles Jordan
Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the
DischargeabilityDebate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 56, 63 (1990) [hereinafter Tabb, The Scope
of the Fresh Start].
56. See William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption
Limitations: The "Opt-Out'"as Child of the First and Parentof the Second, 71 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 149, 155 (1997).
57. See infra Part I.C (discussing exemptions generally).
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"necessary bed and bedding" for him and his family. 58 The primary
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was not to aid debtors, but rather to
address attempts to defraud creditors. 59 Thus, the 1800 Act contributed
little to pro-debtor bankruptcy
laws in general, or to the evolution of the
60
discharge in particular.
The second bankruptcy act, passed in 1841, was the first pro-debtor
bankruptcy law. 6 1 Via two major modifications, which included removing
the restrictions on eligibility for bankruptcy and making the proceedings
voluntary, it "introduced a completely new focus and purpose to [the]
bankruptcy proceeding[s]." 62 It now allowed any debtor, merchant and
nonmerchant alike, to file for bankruptcy independent of the creditor's
position on the matter. 63 Even though the act was repealed just over one
year later, it served as the genesis of voluntary proceedings for bankruptcy
in the United States. 64 "In its very simplicity this law fundamentally
transformed the underlying assumptions regarding the nature of
65
bankruptcy."
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 added an innovative development, as it
66
allowed the debtor to propose a payment plan while keeping his property.
However, as a whole, the laws were still restrictive, as less than one-third of
the bankruptcy proceedings led to a discharge. 67 This was mainly due to
the sustained requirement for the creditors' consent to a debt discharge and
68
to the introduction of additional grounds for denying discharge.

58. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5, 18, 2 Stat. 23, 27; see also Tabb, The
HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 346 n. 150 (noting that this exemption was narrower
than the English statute, which exempted in addition to bedding, all tools of the trade,
furniture, and necessary household goods).
59. See Staring, supra note 38, at 1160.
60. See Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 345.
61. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Tabb, The Scope of the
Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 63; see Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25,
at 16-18.
62. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 349.
63. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 59; Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws,
supra note 25, at 16-17. But see Countryman, supra note 25, at 815 (explaining that
involuntary proceedings remained for debts over $2000).
64. See Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 350-51 (explaining that the act
was repealed due to widespread discontent).
65. Id. at 350; see also id. (noting that many alleged that this act was unconstitutional
because the reference to bankruptcy in the constitution pertains to "bankruptcy" as it existed
in 1789).
66. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); see TABB &
BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 59; Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at
20-21.
67. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 357.
68. See id. at 358-59 (explaining that one of the new provisions for denying discharge
was loss of property due to gambling); Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at
63. Under the Act of 1867, a discharge could also be available with "the debtor's payment
of at least fifty percent of the aggregate debts." See Brown, supra note 56, at 157.
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The Bankruptcy Act of 189869 marked the beginning of the modem era
of pro-debtor bankruptcy laws 70 and represents a paramount milestone in
the evolution of the discharge of debts. 71 With this Act, Congress tried to
make the discharge more readily attainable, eliminating the requirement for
creditors' consent to a discharge. 72 Furthermore, voluntary bankruptcy was
made available on demand to "[a]ny person who owes debts, except a
corporation. '73 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 recognized the public interest
in granting a discharge to a hard-struck debtor and in allowing his return to
74
being a productive member of society.
Building on the previous bankruptcy acts, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 enacted a number of procedural and jurisdictional rules that constitute
the Bankruptcy Code as we have it today. 75 The reformed Bankruptcy
Code is "an elegant and sophisticated piece of legislation" that "swept away
the years of doctrinal cobwebs and incrustations, replacing them with a
lucid, simple, and apparently humane system for dealing with overburdened
debtors and helpless corporations. '76 The modified Bankruptcy Code
encompasses the different avenues available to debtors, including Chapter 7
(liquidation), Chapter 11 (reorganization), and Chapter 13 (individual
rehabilitation); 77 the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges; a new set of federal
exemptions (including the 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption); 78 and the
interconnection of state laws with federal laws. 79 The new Bankruptcy
Code legislated a sweeping reform in response to the previous laws that
were old fashioned and far removed from the contemporary United States. 80
69. ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
70. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 59; Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra
note 32, at 364; Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 23.
71. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 363.
72. See Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 23-24; Tabb, The Scope
of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 65.
73. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4a, 30 Stat. 544, 547 (1898) (repealed 1978).
"The United States Congress in 1898 did not just decline to give the bankruptcy court
control over the discharge. At the same time, that control was taken away from creditors.
The long-standing requirement of either creditor consent or a minimum dividend as a
prerequisite to obtaining a discharge was eliminated. No check on discharges other than the
statutory limitations remained." Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 364.
74. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 364-65.
75. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 137; Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy
Laws, supra note 25, at 32-34.
76. Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
MICH. L. REv. 47, 121 (1997).

77. KUNEY, supra note 5, at xxvii-xxviii.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E) (2006).
79. See George Brody, The New Bankruptcy Court, in THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT

OF 1978 15-30 (Grace W. Holmes ed., 1979) (discussing the jurisdictional limits of the
bankruptcy court).
80. Id. One of the central motivations behind the 1978 reforms was the belief that the
prior bankruptcy law, fashioned mainly in 1898, was ill-equipped to address the explosion of
consumer credit and consumer bankruptcies of recent decades. David A. Moss & Gibbs A.
Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both? 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 311, 328 (1999); Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 32-
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The ratified modifications "made bankruptcy a much more debtor-friendly
81
law."
However, modem era bankruptcy laws have not neglected to take into
account the interests of the creditors whose debtors fail to repay their debts.
In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) was enacted. 82 This pro-creditor act imposed additional
restrictions on consumer bankruptcies, seeking to assure that the bankruptcy
system would help only those in a crucial need.8 3 The most significant
addition was the implementation of the "means test."' 84 This test compares
the debtor's average income to the median for households of the same size
in the debtor's state of residence. 8 5 The means test seeks to ensure that
debtors will pay creditors the maximum that they are able to afford, and if a
debtor has sufficient income to pay back portions of his debts, he will be
ineligible for bankruptcy relief.8 6

BAPCPA also included provisions to

deter serial and abusive bankruptcy filings and mandated consumer
counseling to many of those filing for bankruptcy protection. 87 In addition,
certain consumer protection reforms were also implemented, including a
penalty to a creditor who88 unreasonably rebuffs a negotiation of a
prebankruptcy payment plan.
Cumulatively, the landmark reforms of the bankruptcy law have tailored
it to our modem times where bankruptcy touches multiple comers of
society, including megacorporations, mom-and-pop businesses, mass tort
victims, polluters, and unfortunate individuals. 89 In fact, the current
Bankruptcy Code is the product of historical evolution that was at least two
centuries in the making: what began as a tool to help creditors collect debts
90
has evolved into a mechanism granting relief to downtrodden debtors.
The transformation in the spirit of the law is tightly linked to the social

81. PersonalBankruptcy Consumer Credit Crisis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of the American Bankruptcy Institute), 1997 WL 176645. The increase of
bankruptcy filings in the late 1970s is mainly attributed to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. Moss & Johnson, supra note 80, at 329.
82. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
83. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 141; SHEILA M. WILLIAMS & GEORGE M.
BASHARIS, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005:

LAW AND EXPLANATION 53-54 (2005).
84. WILLIAMS & BASHARIS, supra note 83, at 3.
85. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 141.
86. WILLIAMS & BASHARIS, supra note 83, at 3. Upon signing the bill, President George

W. Bush stated that "[i]n recent years too many people have abused the bankruptcy laws,...
[t]hey walked away from debts even when they had the ability to repay them." Associated
Press, Bush Signs Tougher Bankruptcy Bill into Law, Apr. 20, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/75750 10/.
87. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 142; WILLIAMS & BASHARIS, supra note 83, at
55 ("The requirement of financial management education is intended to prevent repeated
financial failure.").
88. See WILLIAMS & BASHARIS, supra note 83, at 55.
89. Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 5.
90. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution, supra note 32, at 370.
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advancements that were achieved during this period. 9 1 As discussed below,
the current Bankruptcy Law is built on and tightly related to the historical
foundations and policy reasons that gave rise and further growth to this
law.92

B. The Logic Behind the Law: Five Policy Reasonsfor the Bankruptcy
Law
The underlying rationale for the Bankruptcy Code is supported by
multiple interconnected theories. 93 The majority of these theories focus
exclusively on the benefits to either the debtors or the creditors, and,
therefore, they are inherently conflicting. This Part describes five major
policy reasons that, according to bankruptcy scholars, form the rational
foundation for the Bankruptcy Code. This Part is integral to this Note since
the § 522(d)( l1)(E) exemption can be better understood and more
uniformly applied in the context of an overall objective of achieving the
underlying goals of the Bankruptcy Law. Furthermore, the founding
principles of the Bankruptcy Law need to be carefully weighed when a new
focus is considered for the implementation of its exemptions.
1. Facilitating Collection
The U.S. bankruptcy system is well rooted in the English law, 94 where
bankruptcy began as a response to inadequate collection remedies. 95 The
laws provided a means for the debtor's assets to be accounted for and
procurable by his creditors. 96 A discharge was not part of the original 1542
English law, and when it was incorporated into the then-existing law in
1705, it was intended as a reward to encourage the debtor to cooperate in
the discovery and distribution of his assets. 9 7 Based on its underlying
98
reasoning, the discharge has been referred to as the "cooperation" policy.
91. See id.

92. See Hynes, supra note 21, at 134 (recording statistics that financial distress was as
common in previous generations, as 75,000 Americans were sent to debtor prisons in 1833;
relative to the population of that time the ratio is roughly equal to the proportion of
bankruptcy filings in 2002).
93. HERBERT, supra note 3, at 7 ("[B]ankruptcy law may now suffer from a surplus of
theories, some of them very worthy and profoundly insightful but perhaps so removed from
the realities of practice that even their authors sometimes confess they are unlikely to affect
actual practice .... ). Admittedly, "[tihe Code is a fundamentally political document
which, like most statutes, represents a series of horse-trades (some of which have nothing at
all to do with bankruptcy as such)." Id. at 2.
94. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
95. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in
Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 111 (1982); Margaret
Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1049

(1987).
96.
97.
98.
(1986);

See Howard, supranote 95, at 1048.
See id. at 1049; see also supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
John D. Ayer, How To Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355, 368
Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 91.
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Examination of the current U.S. bankruptcy system suggests that facilitating
the creditors' ability to collect assets remains a prevailing theme99 and that
"[e]quality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the
Bankruptcy Code."' 0 0 In fact, some scholars argue that "[b]ankruptcy law,
at its core, is [a] debt-collection law."101 Thus, once a debtor files for
bankruptcy, the distribution of his assets is compulsory, and his property is
gathered, liquidated, and distributed to the benefit of his creditors. 102 This
mandatory procedure helps avoid a "grab law" with a first-come, firstserved characteristic, enabling the court to oversee an orderly liquidation of
the debtor's assets. 10 3 A well-organized liquidation is further facilitated by
several provisions that prohibit creditors from undermining equitable
distribution. 10 4 Furthermore, a debtor can be barred from discharge if he
adversely affects the creditors' ability to discover and collect the assets. 10 5
Hence, violation of basic societal standards, such as fraud, larceny, or
embezzlement would disqualify a debtor from receiving any of the benefits
106
of the Bankruptcy Law.
It is interesting to note that while empowering the creditors' collection
ability has remained an important component of the Bankruptcy Law, "its
power as a collection mechanism [has become] correspondingly
constricted."' 1 7 Although the Bankruptcy Law is primarily concerned with
providing a compulsory forum for debt collection, this function has been
diluted with the increasing liberalization of the discharge and the pro-debtor
08
transformation of the law. 1
99. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973) (citing J.MACLACHLAN,
BANKRUPTCY 20-21 (1956)); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 3 (1986); Howard, supra note 95, at 1050 ("Bankruptcy's collection purpose is visible
despite the fact that our bankruptcy system does not focus on collections for creditors.").
100. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990); see also Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1395 (1985) ("Most of bankruptcy law
is concerned not with defining a debtor's right of discharge, but with providing a compulsory
and collective system for satisfying the claims of creditors."); Posner, supra note 76, at 50.
101. JACKSON, supra note 99, at 3; see also Posner, supra note 76, at 50; Tabb, The Scope
of the Fresh Start,supra note 55, at 90.
102. See Howard, supra note 95, at 1050.
103. See JACKSON, supra note 99, at 8-9; Jackson, supra note 100, at 1396.
104. See Ayer, supra note 98, at 368; Howard, supra note 95, at 1050.
105. See Howard, supra note 95, at 1050.
106. Id. at 1051. Examples of such provisions are concealing property of the estate,
shielding business records, making a false oath, or refusing to obey a lawful order. See Ayer,
supra note 98, at 368. One major factor in bankruptcy legislation has been the protection of
creditors from any undesirable debtor conduct, such as fraud. See Brown, supra note 56, at
152.
107. See Howard, supra note 95, at 1050. The collective function of the bankruptcy law
is an important component of both individual and corporate bankruptcy. However, this Note
focuses on individual and consumer bankruptcy, as the 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption
only applies in this context. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 394 B.R. 8, 12 (D. Conn. 2008); In re
Domanski, 362 B.R. 824, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); Walsh v. Kelin (In re Kelin), 341
B.R. 521, 529 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re David, No. 04-166, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2245,
at *15-17 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2004).
108. See JACKSON, supra note 99, at 226-27; see also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434, 446-47 (1973) (explaining that the discharge is a relatively recent phenomenon).
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2. A Fresh Start
A "fresh start" is one of the modem conventional justifications for the
Bankruptcy Law. 10 9 U.S. bankruptcy law is unique in providing a
mandatory and nonwaivable fresh start, which is enabled by a debt
discharge 1 0 and certain exemptions that permit debtors to keep a minimum
amount of property."'I The purpose of a fresh start is to allow the debtor to
get out from under the weight of his debt and resume being a contributing
member of society. 112 The concept of a fresh start "is absolutely central to
modem American insolvency law. The debtor.., receives a second (or
third or fourth or fifth) chance at making a go of things."'' 13 The essence of
a fresh start is rooted in the need to free an individual's future earnings and
inheritances from his past liabilities. 114 In addition, it "does more than
merely prevent the debtor and his dependents from starving: it promotes
the debtor's rehabilitation by giving him sufficient freedom from the
demands of his creditors and sufficient assets of the appropriate kind to
enable and motivate him to become an economically productive member of
society."115
The U.S. Supreme Court articulated the concept of a fresh start as a vital
privilege: "One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to
'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and
permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes.' 116 It also communicated the
unequivocal importance of emancipating the debtor from the need to devote
109. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 3; JACKSON, supra note 99, at 225; Adam J. Hirsch,
Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh Start," 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175,
206-09 (1994); Howard, supra note 95, at 1050.
110. Compare Hynes, supra note 21, at 140 (explaining that without a discharge the
debtor has little incentive to acquire new assets or to work hard to increase earnings, as these
earnings would not be protected), with id. at 140 n.135 (quoting economists who argue that
with no discharge consumers would work harder in order to repay their debts).
111. See JACKSON, supra note 99, at 225; CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY (1997), as reprintedin TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 66.
112. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 3; Howard, supra note 95, at 1050-51. It is worth
noting that for certain interests, a debtor cannot claim a fresh start. For public policy
reasons, the Bankruptcy Code protects certain types of debts such as mortgages, security,
and leasehold rights. In addition, bankruptcy does not create an unblemished fresh start.
Private companies are allowed to discriminate based on a past bankruptcy filing, which
remains on the debtor's credit report for ten years. HERBERT, supra note 3, at 5-6.
113. HERBERT, supra note 3, at 3. "This financial redemption find[s] roots deep in myths
of the American character. It may not be entirely a coincidence that bankruptcy law became
a permanent feature of American life only in 1898, roughly the time that the 'frontier' was
'closed.' While the 19th century provided [migrating debtors]-with a fresh start in newly
opened lands-the 20th century offered bankruptcy instead." Id. (citation omitted); CHARLES
JORDAN TABB, supra note 30, at 66 ("Today, however, the goal of providing a financial 'fresh
start' for 'honest but unfortunate debtors' has become entrenched in our bankruptcy laws.").
114. See JACKSON, supra note 99, at 227.
115. Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective,
30 UCLA L. REV. 327, 341 (1982).
116. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
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"the whole or a considerable portion of his earnings for an indefinite time in
the future to the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to his
bankruptcy."117
Some scholars argue that a fresh start is justified on moral grounds,
underpinned mainly by the ethical aspects of the debt discharge.11 8 Others
further value the fresh start as a form of forgiveness. 119 Nonetheless, from
a moral perspective, human dignity and the basic common good derived
from allowing the fresh start, would be more significant than any economic
costs and benefits otherwise obtained. 120 Indeed, the legislative history
shows that debtor relief does serve as a humanitarian response to the
financially distressed, as it encompasses attributes of social, distributive,
and commutative justice. 121 Accordingly, if morality and forgiveness play
a role "the focus of the fresh start policy should be on the adequacy of
debtor protection, and not upon the economic or political ramifications of
22
that protection."
3. The Economic Theory
Another important justification for bankruptcy laws pertains to an
economic theory that is endorsed by the "Chicago School" and often
referred to as neoclassical economic theory. 123 This theory emphasizes the
24
importance of efficiency in the implementation of the Bankruptcy Law.1
According to this economic theory, the principle function of bankruptcy law
is to allow for a collective and productive response to financial distress that
will not significantly impinge on the rights available to the parties under

117. Id. at 245; see also HERBERT, supra note 3, at 4 n.9 (explaining that this statement
was issued by a Supreme Court that was viewed as reactionary and unsympathetic to the
plight of those impoverished by the Great Depression); Howard, supra note 95, at 1047 n.1
(arguing that while the quote from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt is the usual citation given for
"honest but unfortunate debtor" it was actually originated in Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S.
68, 77 (1904)); supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing a dishonest debtor).
118. See Hirsch, supra note 109, at 227-29; Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra
note 55, at 95.
119. See Hynes, supra note 21, at 152 n.220 (listing articles that support the forgiveness
theory); see also Tabb, The Historical Evolution, supra note 32, at 365 ("Societal
forgiveness of the debts of the honest unfortunate is considered to be humane.").
120. See Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for
FinancialRehabilitationof the Consumer Debtor,48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 515, 525 (1991);
Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 113 ("Mercy says that the debtor
should be relieved of his debts ....
).
121. See Flint, supra note 120, at 519-20 ("The central justification for the debtor
financial relief provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is founded in a natural law theory of
morality.").
122. Id. at 521.
123. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 8.
124. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953,
981-83 (1981); Howard, supra note 95, at 1063-68; Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start,
supra note 55, at 94-95. See generally JACKSON, supra note 99 (putting forth a law and
economics theory of bankruptcy).
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nonbankruptcy laws.1 25 Supporters of this theory hold that the more
expansive the Bankruptcy Law grows, the greater its inefficiency becomes,
and, therefore, they urge for a reduction in the overall complexity of the
bankruptcy system. 126 Advocates of neoclassical economic theory further
argue that the role of the Bankruptcy Law is to enable both sides to get out
of the financial crisis through a cost- and time-effective mechanism. 12 7
This argument assumes that organized creditors acting collectively will
achieve the greatest possible recovery. 128 Indirectly, such a collective act
will also benefit the rest of the economy, since the risk faced by lenders will
be reduced, enabling them to subsequently make better and cheaper
29
decisions regarding their lending practices.1
The pro-creditor rationale for the economic theory is well delineated in
Louis Levinthal's writing on bankruptcy. Levinthal argues that the
Bankruptcy Law seeks "to secure an equitable division of the insolvent
debtor's property among all his creditors, and, in the second place, to
prevent on the part of the insolvent debtor conduct detrimental to the
interests of his creditors." 130 Proponents of this theory further maintain that
the earlier a debtor is released from his debt, the sooner he can resume his
contribution to society. 13 1 In addition to the financial hardship of the
debtor's fellow countrymen who bear the burden of supporting these
debtors and their families, a large debtor class creates social and political
turmoil. 13 2 Therefore, the simplest solution is to eliminate the core of the

"problem afflicting the debtor class-their debts." 133
The argument that bankruptcy relief helps the entire economy was
utilized by President John Tyler in his campaign for the Bankruptcy Act of
1841.134 He maintained that "[t]he distress incident to the derangements of
some years past has visited large numbers of our fellow-citizens with
hopeless insolvency, whose energies, both mental and physical, by reason

125. See generally JACKSON, supra note 99 (explaining that bankruptcy law should not
fiddle with substantive rights, since it may generate uncertainty and result in increased costs
with no corresponding benefits).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 9 ("[O]ver time it makes more sense for creditors to
share evenly in larger pools of assets from many debtors than to take their chances of being
able to seize a disproportionate number of assets from an occasional, and smaller pool of
assets owned by a few of its debtors.").
129. See id. at 10; Posner, supra note 76, at 51-53; Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start,
supra note 55, at 94-95.
130. Levinthal, supra note 20, at 225.
131. See Hirsch, supra note 109, at 207-08; Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra
note 55, at 94 ("[T]he very 'fabric of society' is weakened by the existence of a large class of
hopeless insolvents.").
132. See Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 94-95 (arguing that until
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, every enactment of a major bankruptcy law took place
after a major financial crisis).
133. Id. at 95; Hirsch, supra note 109, at 207-08.
134. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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of the load of debt pressing upon them, are lost to the country."'1 35 William
Blackstone, in the mid-eighteenth century, also alluded to socioeconomic
benefits that are expected to flow from such a relief, explaining that with
"the assistance of his allowance and his own industry,
[the debtor] may
36
become a useful member of the commonwealth."1
Another economic theory supporting debt discharge is the debtor
cooperation theory. This theory maintains that a discharge of debt is a
carrot offered to the debtor to induce him to cooperate in the bankruptcy
137
proceedings, which include the collection and liquidation of his assets.
Such cooperation is expected to help creditors collect more effectively, as it
increases the amount of assets available for distribution while
38
simultaneously decreasing the administrative cost of distribution. 1
The neoclassical and debtor cooperation theories share common ground.
However, while neoclassical economic theory emphasizes the benefits of
bankruptcy laws to the economy as a whole, the debtor cooperation theory
39
is centered on serving the creditors themselves. 1
4. The Social Theory
An additional theory behind the bankruptcy protection, the social theory,
aspires to secure the psychological well being of the debtor. 140 This theory
emphasizes the demoralizing impact of indebtedness and explains that "a
hopeless, unrelievable financial situation leads to a very costly social
situation with its resulting relief costs, suicides, and criminality concomitant
to financial despair."' 14 1 According to this theory, a debt discharge has an
42
additive value of liberating a debtor from his psychological oppression.1
135. See Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 94 (quoting 4 J.
RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897,
at 54-55 (1897)); see also Hirsch, supra note 109, at 207-08 (discussing the effects that an
impoverished debtor may have on society as a whole).
136. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution, supra note 32, at 339 (quoting 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *471-72).
137. See Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 90-94; supra notes 99-108
and accompanying text.
138. See Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 90-91 (noting that this
theory was the justification for the discharge in England and for the Bankruptcy Act of
1800).
139. See supra Part I.B. I.See generally Howard, supra note 95, at 1049-50, 1062-68
(discussing the different roles of bankruptcy with a focus on the collective mechanism and
the economic theory as separate goals of the Bankruptcy Law).
140. See Hirsch, supra note 109, at 202-06; Howard, supra note 95, at 1061; Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 785-86 (1983)
(explaining that the bankruptcy law is used to prevent a debt from demoralizing a person's
confidence); Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 55, at 95-99 (explaining the
theory behind bankruptcy laws based on a humanitarian theory).
141. G. Stanley Joslin, The Philosophy of Bankruptcy-A Re-examination, 17 U. FLA. L.
REv. 189, 191 (1964).
142. See Howard, supra note 95, at 1061; Doug Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge:
Toward a FresherStart, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723, 725-26 (1980) (explaining that the discharge
of debt "liberates the bankrupt psychologically").
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Conceivably, the newly freed debtor would now generate a renewed
confidence in his ability to resurrect his future and to regain his self43
respect. 1

This theory is intertwined with the notion of a "fresh start." It tries to
focus on the social aspects of bankruptcy without applying an allencompassing theoretical model or fundamental rules that attempt to
attribute a monetary value to the Bankruptcy Law. 144 Proponents of this
theory point to empirical data suggesting that consumer debtors are
comprised of people with a broad range of occupations, that such debtors
are likely to own their homes, and that bankruptcy is often preceded by a
long period of economic trouble rather than a sudden crisis. 14 5 In essence,
any legitimately hardworking individual could be affected in trying
times.' 46 Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that few people file for a
second bankruptcy after being granted a discharge in the first. 147 Therefore,
according to the social theorists, any economic inefficiency, which may be
consequent to the bankruptcy relief, is a modest price for society to pay for
the financial and psychological well-being of its debtors. 14 8 A scholar
writing in 1919 illustrated this notion, stating that "[t]he history of these
laws is evidence of man's humanity to his fellow man."' 14 9 The author
further characterized bankruptcy not as "a crime, but as a misfortune, not as
a disgrace, but as a malady which needs the soothing remedy of sympathy
and encouragement."' 150
The psychological well-being of the debtor as a basic principle of the
social theory was also acknowledged in Justice Joseph Story's writings on
bankruptcy: bankruptcy legislation is set up "to relieve the unfortunate and
meritorious debtor from a slavery of mind and body, which cuts him off
from a fair enjoyment of the common benefits of society, and robs his
family of the fruits of his labour, and the benefits of his paternal
superintendence." 151
According to social theorists, the discharge is justified as a multifaceted
humane act to free the hopeless from their debts. It can be viewed as a form
of forgiveness of debts, 152 as well as a mechanism to enhance the intrinsic
self-worth of the debtor, allowing him to restore his physical and
143. Howard, supra note 95, at 1061.
144. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 12; Howard, supra note 95, at 1061.
145. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 85-95,129, 168-

69(1989).
146. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 12-13.
147. See SULLIVAN, supra note 145, at 192-95.
148. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 14; see also Hynes, supra note 21, at 163 (arguing
that the psychological toll on the debtor has lessened in modem times, as a social stigma and
public embarrassment are no longer attached to filing for bankruptcy).
149. NOEL, supra note 14, at 200.
150. Id.
151. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1101
(1833), as reprintedin TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 62.
152. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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psychological ability to function.1 53 Even more so, the society as a whole
"mak[ing] us all
will benefit from the promotion of humanitarian values,
154
better people" with more "worthy" members among us.
5. The Debtor Rehabilitation Theory
A House Judiciary Committee report states that an additional purpose of
bankruptcy is the "effective rehabilitation of the [debtor], 155 as allowing
the debtor to resume participation in the open credit economy can act as a
form of rehabilitation. 156 This rehabilitation theory is also linked to the
157
concepts of fresh start and the economic theory described above.
However, as part of the recent 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,
rehabilitation has taken a new form. Until 2005, the Code did not provide
for a means of financial education; however, some instructional programs
were utilized. 158 The recently amended Bankruptcy Code conditions the
debtor's eligibility for a discharge on completion of a financial education
program. 159 "This reform suggests that Congress views financial education
160
as a valuable tool that enables debtors to capitalize on the fresh start."
Cumulatively, the policy reasons behind the current Bankruptcy Law
accentuate the social, economic, and psychological benefits not only to the
two parties to the dispute-creditors and debtors-but to the
commonwealth as a whole.
C. Can 't Touch This: Exemptions Under the Bankruptcy Code
A major portion of the Bankruptcy Code is devoted to bankruptcy
exemptions. 16 1 A bankruptcy exemption allows for the exclusion of certain
properties from the bankruptcy estate and thereby protects them from the
Under the U.S. bankruptcy system, there are federal
creditors. 162
exemptions as well as state exemptions, 163 and states have the option to opt
out of the federal exemptions.' 64 Bankruptcy exemptions were enacted
153. See Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start,supra note 55, at 95.

154. Id. at 95-96.
155. H.R. REP. No. 89-687, at 2 (1965).
156. Howard, supra note 95, at 1062; see supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
157. See supra Part I.B.2-3.

158. See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start,
92 CORNELL L. REv. 67, 73 (2006).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006).
162. See generally FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 465.
163. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 left the exemptions up to the various states to decide.
In contrast, the 1978 reform enacted its own set of federal exemptions because of concerns
that the exemption laws were limited and out of date. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1,
at 419. For a discussion of the history of federal and state bankruptcy law, see Brown, supra
note 56, at 151-63.
164. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1); Judith S. Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption
Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 22,
27-28 (1983). Thirty-four states have opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions. They
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with "a view to general national purposes"' 165 trying to assure that debtors
have adequate assets to support a minimum standard of living, without
becoming a public charge. 166 The legislative history behind the bankruptcy
exemption statutes indicates that the purpose of the exemption laws has
been "to protect a debtor from his creditors, [and] to provide him with the
basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his
nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a public
charge. [This] purpose has not changed."' 167 Keeping some basic and
critical items as well as crucial assets would give debtors a realistic prospect
of achieving the "fresh start" that bankruptcy promises.1 68 Under certain
circumstances, bankruptcy exemptions can be more essential to the overall
bankruptcy relief than a discharge. 169 However, striking the appropriate
balance between indulgence and necessity may be a rather challenging
task. 170
Accordingly, the rational foundation for the bankruptcy exemptions is
firmly tied to the economic and social policies endorsed by the
legislature. 17 1 The underlying reasoning includes the provision of the
debtor with "property necessary for his physical survival," the protection of
his "dignity and [his] cultural and religious identity," and the protection of
his family "from the adverse consequences of impoverishment,"--thereby
enabling the debtor to "rehabilitate himself financially and earn income in
the future;" and shifting some of the burden of supporting the debtor's
family from society to the creditors. 172 Consistent with the concept of
provision of only the essential needs of the debtor and his family, some
statutes, both state and federal, limit the exemptions "to the extent

include the following: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 419 n.2 1.
165. Koffler, supra note 164, at 31.
166. Margaret Howard, Exemptions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments: A Tale of
OpportunityLost, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 397 (2005); Koffler, supra note 164, at 30.
167. Veryl Victoria Miles, A Debtor's Right To Avoid Liens Against Exempt Property
Under Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code: Meaningless or Meaningful?, 65 AM. BANKR.

L.J. 117, 135 (1991) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087).
168. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 1, at 465.
169. See Koffler, supra note 164, at 32-33.
170. See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 185.
171. See Brown, supra note 56, at 169.
172. Alan N. Resnick, PrudentPlanningor Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt
Assets To Purchaseor Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L.

REv. 615, 621 (1978). See generally Frank Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in
Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REv. 445 (1960) (explaining that the protection of the debtor's
family is the main objective of the exemption legislation). "The emphasis most often is upon
the allowance of 'the basic necessities of life,' with the somewhat contradictory qualification
that the debtor should not 'be left destitute and a public charge."' Brown, supra note 56, at
170 (quoting Fin. One v. Bland (In re Bland), 793 F.2d 1172, 1173 (1 1th Cir. 1986)).
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reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
73
debtor."1
Altogether, the bankruptcy exemptions "play a critical role in the
preservation of a healthy economy and a stable society," and, therefore,
consideration
their purpose and underlying rationale should be an important
74
in the implementation of the § 522(d)( 11)(E) exemption. 1
D. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11) (E): A Difficult-To-UnderstandExemption
The current framework of the Bankruptcy Law in the United States was
established with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1979.175 The
Code included the 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(l l)(E) exemption, and it has not
been altered or amended since. 176 This specific section of the Bankruptcy
Code deals with potential exemptions that a debtor may use in his
bankruptcy proceeding. The statute states,
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(2) of
this section:
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to...
(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the
debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent,
for the support of the debtor
to the extent reasonably necessary
77
and any dependent of the debtor. 1
This statute is present in the bankruptcy laws of multiple states. 178 While
a number of states have opted out of the federal exemptions, 179 many have
enacted very similar statutes, and some have even copied the exact language
of § 522(d)(11)(E) into their own bankruptcy laws. 180 Exemption of a
payment in compensation of loss of future earnings is of significance, as
any interest in potential future income has consistently been held to be
property of the bankruptcy estate. 181 Yet, in the millions of bankruptcy
cases filed throughout the United States since 1979,182 less than one
183
hundred court decisions have analyzed the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(10)(D), 522(d)(11)(E) (2006)
See Koffler, supra note 164, at 106.
See HERBERT, supra note 3, at 51.
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
Id.
See sources cited infra note 180.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

180. Hynes, supra note 21, at 139; see e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-100(a)(11)(E)
(2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422(14)(E) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-111(3)

(2000).
181. See In re Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993).
182. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 30, at 55-56.
183. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 394 B.R. 8, 11 (D. Conn. 2008); In re Domanski, 362 B.R.
824, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); Walsh v. Kelin (In re Kelin), 341 B.R. 521, 529 (Bankr.
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Although this exemption would apparently apply only in cases where the
debtor receives a settlement to be paid as a wage substitute for loss of future
earnings, its infrequent usage is somewhat surprising. Even more so, the
useful practitioner's guide to bankruptcy Collier on Bankruptcy does not
offer explanations regarding this statute.1 84 In fact, an analysis is given for
each of the first four subsections of § 522(d)(1 1), but there is no mention of
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E).1 85 In theory, it is possible that a consequent unfamiliarity
of practitioners with the statute led to its sparse usage even in cases where it
186
might have been appropriate.
As stated, the statute is arguably ambiguous, particularly with regard to
the following issues: What constitutes "future earnings"? Should the court
decide if a specific payment is destined to compensate for "future
earnings"? Should courts permit the combination of this exemption with
the others included in § 522(d)(1 1)? Courts have grappled with these
issues, but have not reached a consensus on how to apply this statute.
Several courts have noted the lack of clarity, stating that "[t]he Bankruptcy
Code provides no guidance concerning what qualifies as lost future
earnings for purposes of § 522(d)(1 1)(E),"' 187 that the court "is not aware of
any case law interpreting this language," 188 and that "the court has found no
case law that directly determines the relationship between pre- and post189
petition loss of earnings under section 522(d)(1 1)(E)."'
To complicate matters, debtors often make motions to exempt property
using both § 522(d)(11)(D) and § 522(d)(11)(E). 190 Section 522(d)(1I)(D)
allows the exemption of "a payment, not to exceed $20,200, on account of
personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for
actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a
dependent." 19 1 Courts have struggled to define "personal bodily injury,"
and whether it should include mental and emotional injuries.' 92 Thus,
§ 522(d)(1 1)(D) with its own share of ambiguity "has caused considerable

W.D. Pa. 2006); In re David, No. 04-166, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *15-17 (Bankr.
D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2004).
184. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.09 (15th ed. rev. 2006).
185. See id. § 522.20.
186. See generally id.
187. Kelin, 341 B.R. at 529.
188. In re Domanski, 362 B.R. at 828; see also In re Bartholomew, 214 B.R. 322, 325
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) ("There is very little case law interpreting this statute in Ohio
courts or a similar provision in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E).").
189. In re Jackson, 394 B.R. 8, 11 (D. Conn. 2008).
190. See In re Lowery, No. 05-13536-WHD, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3729, at *8-10 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2007); In re Scotti, 245 B.R. 17, 19 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000); In re Bova, 205
B.R. 467, 475-78 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); Gaertner v. Claude (In re Claude), 206 B.R. 374,
375 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997); In re Rockefeller, 100 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989).
191. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) (2006).
192. See generally Louis J. Papera, Note, Confusion over § 522(d)(11)(D): What
Congress Really Meant by Exempting Paymentsfor "PersonalBodily Injury'"and Why They
Got It Wrong, 16 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 503 (2000) (discussing the conflicting approaches

in applying the § 522(d)(1 1)(D) exemption).
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consternation" 193 and "has been the bane of many bankruptcy judges."' 94
The blurred lines between these exemptions may also stem from the fact
that some courts have decided cases based on the § 522(d)(l 1)(D)
195
exemption while avoiding the analysis of § 522(d)(11)(E).
Thus, the obscurity of the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption is mainly derived
from the ambiguous wording of the statute, and the preferential utilization
of the related § 522(d)( 11)(D) exemption as a substitute for determining the
196
compensation in cases of personal bodily injuries.
II. "FUTURE EARNINGS": WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND How Is IT APPLIED?
Part I provided information on the history and rationale of bankruptcy
law in the United States, and also introduced the § 522(d)(ll)(E)
exemption. This Part examines substantial conflicts in the application of 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(l 1)(E).
It includes an assessment of whether the
exemption is limited strictly to a payment in compensation of tort-related
injuries. It also examines the time frame relative to the bankruptcy filing
date that would satisfy the term "future" in the statute's wording. It further
discusses a potential retroactive allocation of a certain amount of the
settlement as a payment for "future earnings." Finally, it assesses the
combined use of the 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(l 1)(D) and § 522(d)(l 1)(E)
exemptions. These issues are particularly pertinent to the situation faced by
Joe the Steelworker when confronted with a combination of bankruptcy and
a monetary settlement for his injury.
A. "FutureEarnings": What Is Included?
1. Do Grounds for Compensation Play a Role in Its Exemption?
The legislative history behind § 522(d)( 11)(E) states that its purpose is
"to cover payments in compensation of actual bodily injury, such as the loss
of a limb, and is not intended to include the attendant costs that accompany
such a loss, such as medical payments, pain and suffering, or loss of
earnings. Those items are handled separately by the bill." 197 In In re
Seymour the court reasoned based on the legislative history that the intent
of Congress in enacting this exemption was "to protect those amounts that
are meant to replace the debtor's source of future support to the extent that
198
it is necessary to allow for the debtor's fresh start."'

193. Walsh v. Kelin (In re Kelin), 341 B.R. 521, 528 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
194. Walsh v. Reschick (In re Reschick), 343 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
195. See, e.g., Kaliner v. Murphy (In re Murphy), No. 98-36084, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 59
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2000) (ruling that since other exemptions apply, there is no need to
ascertain whether § 522(d)(1 1)(E) is applicable).
196. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
197. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 362 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087.
198. In re Seymour, 285 B.R. 57, 59 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002).
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Courts have agreed that the § 522(d)( 11)(E) exemption does not include
actual future earnings but, rather, only payments that are made to the debtor
as a specific compensation for loss of future earnings. 199 However, in light
of Congress's reasoning for implementing this exemption, a major
unresolved issue that remains is whether § 522(d)(1 1)(E) only applies to
"compensation of loss of future earnings" 20 0 stemming from a bodily injury
tort case or whether it can be applied to other instances not necessarily
involving physical traumas. Would the hypothetical Joe the Steelworker be
able to use the § 522(d)(ll)(E) exemption only for a monetary
compensation made for bodily trauma or also for potential compensation
made on different grounds, such as wrongful termination or sexual
harassment?
An Ohio court, interpreting its state statute that is identical in its language
to § 522(d)(l l)(E), held that the exemption is not restricted to
compensation made for loss of future earnings as a result of bodily injury:
"compensation for loss of future earnings implies a payment based on an
accident or some type of mishap that impairs the ability of the recipient to
earn wages."... Thus ... exemptible compensation under [the Ohio
statute] requires that it be for more than bodily injury; as a result of the
injury, the Debtor must
have additionally received compensation for the
20 1
loss of future wages.
A divergent ruling by the court in In re Williams indicated that "[b]ased
on this legislative history ... § 522(d)(1 1) only cover[s] compensation
received in the nature of tort liability. '20 2 Consequently, the exemption
03
would be limited to compensation stemming from a physical mishap. 2
199. In re Bartholomew, 214 B.R. 322, 325 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) (citing In re Carson,
82 B.R. 847 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)). It should be noted that evidence of past earnings is
not a prerequisite for granting an exemption for loss of future earnings, since there are cases
where the plaintiff did not have a job and still the exemption was granted. In re Gilbert, 213
B.R. 502, 503-04 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997).
200. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E) (2006).

Black's Law Dictionary defines "earnings" as

"[r]evenue gained from labor or services, from the investment of capital, or from assets."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (9th ed. 2009). The term "earnings" has been perceived as

broader in scope than "wages" or "salary," which are also used in the Bankruptcy Code. See
Litzler v. Sholdra (In re Sholdra), 270 B.R. 64, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) ("Reading

'earnings' as broader in scope (or at least something other) than salary or wages is consistent
with both the common meanings accorded the words and the meanings given in Black's Law
Dictionary. Wages are paid for time actually worked. Salary refers to a periodic payment for
services rendered without regard to time worked. Earnings refers to all income generated by
an individual." (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (7th ed. 1999))).
201. In re Domanski, 362 B.R. 824, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (quoting In re Phillips,
45 B.R. 529, 531 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)); see also Pope III v. Clark (In re Clark), 274
B.R. 127, 138 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that the § 522(d)(11)(E) exemption does not
apply to compensation paid as restitution for money that was wrongfully converted, as it is
not intended to replace a source of future income).
202. In re Williams, 181 B.R. 298, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995).
203. See In re Simon, 71 B.R. 65, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) ("The word
'compensation' would seem to indicate that this was the section for tort settlements.");
Casarow v. Evans (In re Evans), 29 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983) (holding that "[t]he
entire tenor of § 522(d)(1 1) relates to tort compensation, i.e. crime victim's reparation, life
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Contrasting comments in In re Sanchez stated that there is "nothing
within the language of Section 522(d)(1 1)(E) to suggest that the restricted
exemption provided therein could not also include settlements, judgments,
or awards for lost future earnings arising from workers' compensation or
other non-tort related claims. '20 4 This opinion implies that compensation
for loss of future earnings on the basis of grounds other than bodily injury
would fully qualify for this exemption. 20 5 This ruling was further affirmed
by an additional court that maintained that "Section 522(d)(1 1)(E) is clear,
concise, and stands alone. It does not require bodily injury as a prerequisite
for exemption. '20 6 Indeed, courts have chosen this interpretation, allowing
the application of the § 522(d)(11)(E) exemption to payments received by
the debtor for wrongful termination, 20 7 § 1983 claims, 20 8 disability
payments, 20 9 buyouts, 2 10 and sexual harassment claims. 2 1 1 This approach
has been further supported by a court's explicit contention that no societal
interest would be served by allowing a debtor "to exempt compensation for
lost future earnings caused by bodily injury but denying the benefit of the
exemption to other debtors whose loss of earnings results from a wrongful
act that does not inflict actual harm to their person (e.g., retaliatory
discharge, breach of contract, etc.). '2 12
2. Can § 522(d)( 11)(E) Be Used in a Workers' Compensation Claim?
Assuming that the down and out debtor, Joe the Steelworker, was injured
while on the job and received a settlement through workers' compensation,
would such a payment be eligible for the § 522(d)(l 1)(E) exemption?
insurance payments, bodily injury and loss of future earnings .... Therefore, section
522(d)(1 1) is most reasonably interpreted as applying to general tort-related awards").
204. In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. 342, 359 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007); see also In re Carson,
82 B.R. 847, 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that reading bodily injury into
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E) ignores the plain wording of the statute).
205. See In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. at 359.
206. In re Lewis, 406 B.R. 518, 521 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
207. See In re Jackson, 394 B.R. 8 (D. Conn. 2008) (using the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption

in a case of a settlement for a wrongful termination); In re Carson, 82 B.R. at 856 (allowing
the exemption for a settlement of a suit under the Employment Discrimination Act).
208. See In re David, No. 04-166, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *16 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept.
8, 2004) (allowing the § 522(d)( 11)(E) exemption on part of damages to be paid out from a
§ 1983 lawsuit).
209. In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. at 342.
210. In re Lewis, 406 B.R. at 518 (ruling that § 522(d)(11)(E) can apply to buyouts).
211. See In re Hanson, 226 B.R. 106, 108-09 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998) (holding that the
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E) equivalent state statute could be used to exempt a claim of sexual
harassment that does not involve bodily injury). The fact that the legislative history of
§ 522(d)( 11)(E) explicitly states that the exception is for "compensation of actual bodily
injury" would not preclude a court from applying it in other instances as well. See BedRoc
Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) ("The preeminent canon of statutory
interpretation requires us to 'presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there.' Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text,
and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.").
212. In re Carson, 82 B.R. at 856 (citing In re Forbes, 58 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1986)).
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Courts have disagreed on whether workers' compensation claims are
exempt under § 522(d)(1 1)(E). In In re LaBelle,2 13 a severely disabled
debtor, who received weekly workers' compensation payments, argued that
these benefits should be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(C), which applies to
"[t]he debtor's right to receive... a disability, illness, or unemployment
benefit. '2 14 The trustee argued that workers' compensation awards fall
within the scope of § 522(d)(1 1)(E), and, thus, the exemption should be
limited only to what is reasonably necessary to support a debtor and his
215
dependents, as prescribed in the statute.
The court ruled that the entire workers' compensation benefit may be
exempted under § 522(d)(10)(C), as workers' compensation payments do
not fall under § 522(d)(1 1)(E). 2 16 Citing the legislative history, the court
explained that "[t]he House Report in discussing paragraph (10) speaks of
'benefits that are akin to future earnings[,]' [and] [i]n discussing paragraph
(11) it speaks of 'compensation for losses."' 2 17 The court thereby reasoned
that, since § 522(d)(1 1)(E) refers to recoveries for losses that could amount
to hundreds of thousands of dollars, it was necessary for Congress to limit
the exemption to only what is reasonably necessary to support the debtor
and his dependents. 2 18 In contrast, § 522(d)(10)(C) has no stated limitation
as it only "exempts benefits that are strictly akin to future earnings of the
debtor." 2 19
Such benefits, the court ruled, encompass workers'
compensation, which would not need to be limited under the Bankruptcy
Code, because workers' compensation has its own independent limitations
incorporated in the Workers Compensation Act. 220 Other courts have also
ruled that workers' compensation awards can only be exempt under
22 1
§ 522(d)(10)(C) and not § 522(d)(1 1)(E).
Yet, another court in In re Sanchez222 ruled differently. In that case, the
debtor requested the exemption of a lump sum payment that was part of a
settlement attributable to a workers' compensation claim pursuant to the

213. 18 B.R. 169 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C) (2006); see In reLaBelle, 18 B.R. at 169 n.4.
215. In reLaBelle, 18 B.R. at 169.
216. See id.at 171; see also In re Williams, 181 B.R. 298, 300-01 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1995) (holding that workers' compensation is beyond the scope of § 522(d)(11)(D) and (E));
In re Thomas, No. 4-89-6305, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1020 (Bankr. D. Minn. May 11, 1990)
(holding that a workers' compensation award can only be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(C)
and not under § 522(d)(1 1)(E)); Casarow v. Evans (In re Evans), 29 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1983) (ruling on similar facts that "section 522(d)(1 1) is most reasonably interpreted
as applying to general tort-related awards, and not workers' compensation awards").
217. In reLaBelle, 18 B.R. at 170 (citing H.R. 595, 95th Cong. 362 (1977)).
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Szybist v. Michael (In re Michael), 262 BR. 296, 298 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2001);
In re Chavis, 207 B.R. 845, 847-48 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997); In re Williams, 181 B.R. at
300-02; In re Cain, 91 B.R. 182, 183-84 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); Evans, 29 B.R. at 339
n.213.
222. 362 B.R. 342 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007).
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§ 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption. 223 The court held that § 522(d)(10) and
§ 522(d)(1 1) are not mutually exclusive, and a workers' compensation
settlement can be exempted under § 522(d)( 1)(E) as well as under
§ 522(d)(10)(C). 22 4 The court reasoned that § 522(d)(10)(C) does not

encompass all the possible outcomes that may result from a workers'
compensation claim, and, therefore, it is not the only acceptable exemption

for such a claim. 225 The court also partly relied on the fact that an
exemption should be "liberally construed in favor of the debtor. '226
B. "FutureEarnings": When Do They Start?
Courts have explicitly ruled that the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption can only
apply to lost future income and not past earnings. 227 A recent decision
distinctly ruled that the § 522(d)(ll)(E) exemption only applies to a

payment in compensation for the loss of future earnings that come about

after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy. 228 In that case, Richard Jackson
and Angela Shelton, husband and wife, worked for the same company and
were simultaneously fired on March 13, 2003.229 Thereafter, they filed a
wrongful termination lawsuit. 230 Subsequently, on October 31, 2003,
Jackson and Shelton filed a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and
pursuant to § 522(d)(11)(E), exempted the value of their lawsuit from the
estate.231 In April 2004, Jackson and Shelton received $135,000 in a
settlement of their wrongful termination suit. 23 2 The agreement specified

223. Id.at 345.
224. Id.at 356.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 358 (listing cases that hold that exemptions should receive a liberal rather
than a narrow interpretation); see also id. (explaining that the In re LaBelle court could agree
with this ruling, as that holding was specific to the trustee's argument that the workers'
compensation claim should be exempt under § 522(d)(1 1)(E), whereas in the present case the
debtor argued for the use of the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption for a workers' compensation
settlement). It is interesting to note that the two cited cases, In re LaBelle and In re Sanchez,
had contradictory rulings on the exemption of workers' compensation under § 522(d)( 11)(E),
but both ruled in favor of the debtors. Although the two courts drew different inferences
from the ambiguous language of the law, they both remained dedicated to the pro-debtor
purpose of the § 522(d)( 11)(E) exemption. See In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. at 342; In re LaBelle,
18 B.R. 169, 170 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
227. See In re Basket, No. C07-5700RJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43995, at *14 (W.D.
Wash. June 2, 2008) (ruling that the § 522(d)(11)(E) exemption should not be allowed
because the settlement was for past wages, not future wages); Pequeno v. Schmidt, 307 B.R.
568, 584 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) (ruling that the lawsuit settlement was not compensation
for future earnings, and thus not exempt).
228. See In re Jackson, 394 B.R. 8, 11 (D. Conn. 2008); see also Klein v. Chappell (In re
Chappell), 373 B.R. 73, 77 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) ("'[T]he critical date for determining
exemption rights is the petition date."' (quoting Goswami v. MTC Dist. (In re Goswami),
304 B.R. 386, 391-92 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003))).
229. See In re Jackson, 394 B.R. at 10.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. The settlement specifically stated that the payment was only for compensation
for Jackson's termination; Shelton dropped her claim as part of the agreement. Id.
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that the compensation of Jackson's lost future earnings covered the period
between March 14, 2003, and March 13, 2004.233 The Bankruptcy Court
held that the term "loss of future earnings" in § 522(d)(1 1)(E) allows the
debtor to exempt only the future earnings that would have been paid after
the commencement of the bankruptcy case. 2 34 Thus, since there were 366
days accounted for in the settlement (March 14, 2003, to March 13, 2004),
and only 135 of those days were after the October 31, 2003, petition date,
the exemption should only account for the prorated portion of those 135
235
days.
On appeal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut stated
that "the court has found no case law that directly determines the
relationship between pre- and post-petition loss of earnings under section
522(d)( 11)(E)." '236 The court went on to reason that a debtor's estate is
indisputably created on the bankruptcy petition date; 237 and that "[t]he clear
and unambiguous language of the statute.., allows an exemption for a loss
of any future earnings after creation of that estate." 238 Therefore, the
239
district court affirmed the ruling of the bankruptcy court.
Other courts, while not specifically analyzing the pre- and postpetition
issue, have seemingly ruled otherwise or have not addressed the issue. In In
re Scotti240 the debtor sued his doctor for malpractice during a routine
procedure that occurred in August 1993.241 Approximately five years later,
on April 24, 1998, the debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 242 Thereafter, he settled his medical
malpractice action for $85,000 and sought to exempt $23,635.16 under
§ 522(d)( l1)(E). 243 The court assumed that the complaint filed in the
medical malpractice case included a broadly worded clause, which could be
construed to include payment for lost wages, and, therefore, the court ruled
against the Trustee's motion and allowed the exemption. 24 4 Although it is
reasonable to assume that such a payment for compensation of lost earnings
would at least partly correspond to the prepetition time period, the court

233. Id.

234. Id. (citing In re Jackson, 376 B.R. 75, 78 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007)).
235. See id. (citing In re Jackson, 376 B.R. at 79); see also In re Hurst, 239 B.R. 89, 92
(Bankr. D. Md. 1999) (holding that "any portion of [the debtor's]... settlement or award
that is for prepetition lost wages may not be exempted" under the Maryland statute that is
equivalent to § 522(d)(1 1)(E)).
236. In re Jackson, 394 B.R. at 11.
237. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006)).
238. Id. (explaining that to read the term "future" as applying to all earnings after the date
of termination, and not the date of the petition, is against the clear language of the statute,
and "[t]o allow an exemption for earnings prior to the petition date would make the statute
retroactive instead of future looking").
239. Id. at 12.
240. 245 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000).

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21-22.
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allowed the utilization of § 522(d)(1 1)(E) despite the lengthy interval of
almost five years between the malpractice and the filing dates. 24 5
These cases demonstrate that the inconclusiveness of the term "future" in
the statute has engendered contradictory rulings with regard to
compensation that retroactively covered, at least partly, the prepetition
period.
C. "FutureEarnings": Can They Be Retroactively Assumed
into a Settlement?
Bankruptcy cases in which the debtor attempts to invoke the
§ 522(d)(11)(E) exemption usually involve a monetary settlement that the
debtor wishes to exclude from his bankruptcy estate. However, often
enough these settlements fail to state or are vague about what the payment
is meant to compensate for.246 Would the $120,000 settlement of Joe the
Steelworker be exempt under § 522(d)( 1l)(E) even though it did not
contain a specific allocation for future earnings? The retroactive allocation
of future earnings into a monetary settlement has been met with
contradictory attitudes by different courts: while some have adamantly
refused to involve speculation in their ruling, others have been willing to
estimate the proportion of future earnings within an existing monetary
settlement.
In In re Whitson24 7 a debtor tried to exempt a $130,000 settlement from a
personal injury lawsuit under § 522(d)(11)(E). 24 8 The trustee argued that
the court "should determine which portion of the award [was] attributable to
[the debtor's] loss of future earnings. '249 The court ruled that such a
decision would be based on speculation, and was of the opinion that
"[w]hen called upon to allocate an award or settlement to exemptible and
non-exemptible damages, courts should not resort to speculation." 250 The
court ruled that the trustee did not meet the burden of proof necessary to
establish that the settlement was not properly exemptible. 25 1
245. Id. at 22; see also In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. 342, 359-60 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007)

(holding that when the bankruptcy petition was filed on October 16, 2005, and a settlement
was paid forty-seven days earlier on August 30, 2005, the court allowed the use of the
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption, but did not prorate the settlement payment, so that only wages
from the postpetition date would be exempted).
246. See, e.g., Mercer v. Monzack, 170 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994) (a settlement
was made "with no designation or allocation of funds to any specific category of damages").
247. 319 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).
248. Id. at 615.
249. Id. at 616.
250. Id.at 617. When the settlement clearly states that it is a payment for "personal
physical injur[i]es" the court will not speculate on the meaning of an unambiguous
document. See Prichard v. Wheatley, No. 3:06CV-230-H, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65043, at
*3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 2006).
251. In re Whitson, 319 B.R. at 618. The trustee, who is the objecting party, has the
burden to prove that the proceeds are not compensation for lost earnings. In re Gilbert, 213
B.R. 502, 503 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(c) (the trustee bears
the burden of proof that any exemption is not properly claimed).
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An additional example of a court's refusal to speculate retroactively on
the specific allocation of a monetary settlement is demonstrated in In re
Pless.252 In this case, a debtor settled a claim stemming from a car accident
for $25,000 and "there was no allocation made with respect to the monies to
be paid to the [d]ebtor under the terms of the [s]ettlement delineating a
portion to bodily injury and another to the loss of future earnings." 253 The
court declined to speculate which portion was designated to compensate for
future earnings and, therefore, did not grant the New York state equivalent
of the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption. 254 In In re Cramer25 5 a jury award of
$55,500 for a personal injury designated a specific amount for lost earnings,
but did not distinguish between loss of future earnings and loss of past
earnings. 256 The court granted the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption for the
approximate amount of $20,000 remaining after other exemptions were
used.257
The court refused to speculate on the amount that would
correspond to future earnings, explaining that it would not be necessary had
the creditor met his burden of proof.258 Indeed, the court stated that "'the
fact that we have been reduced to speculation necessarily mandates the
259
conclusion that the [objector] has not met his burden."'
Yet, other courts did permit an assumption that a payment for lost wages
was included in the settlement. In In re Scotti2 60 the court assumed that the
medical malpractice settlement included an ad damnum clause to
compensate a claim for lost wages. 261 The court in In re Smith, 262 while
deciding the case for other reasons, designated part of the proceeds from a
$100,000 settlement as future earnings, even though the settlement itself did
263
not contain specific allocations.

252. 202 B.R. 664 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996).
253. Id. at 667-68.
254. Id.at 668.
255. 130 B.R. 193 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
256. See id. at 194-95.
257. See id. at 195.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting In re Magnus, 84 B.R. 976, 979 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)); see also In re
Patterson, 128 B.R. 737, 741 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (declining § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption

and sustaining the trustee's objection because "the settlement was never reduced to writing
and... there was in fact no particular allocation agreement or understanding").
260. In re Scotti, 245 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000).
261. See id.; supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
262. 179 B.R. 437 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
263. Id. at 446 n.4 ("[T]he fact that (1) the initial lump sum payment covered most, if not
all damages other than the Debtor's considerable lost wages; (2) the Debtor in fact suffered a
substantial wage loss as a result of her injuries; and (3) the payments were made to her
personally, make such an allocation reasonable and acceptable."); In re Harris, 50 B.R. 157,
159-61 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (holding that where a settlement made no distinction
between medical expenses, actual loss, or anything else, the creditor has not met the burden
of proof to establish that the exemptions are not properly claimed); see also In re Haga, 48
B.R. 492, 496 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (allowing an allocation of settlement to be
designated for loss of future income); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Territo (In re Territo), 36
B.R. 667, 671 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (allowing a settlement to be reasonably attributed to
loss of future earnings).
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D. Can § 522(d)(1 1)(E) Be Used in Combinationwith the Other
Exemptions in § 522(d)(11)?
Another exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) states,
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(2) of
this section:
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to...
(D) a payment, not to exceed $20,200, on account of personal
bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation
for actual pecuniary loss, of the
debtor or an individual of whom
264
the debtor is a dependent ....
Would Joe the Steelworker be able to use both the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) and
the § 522(d)( 11)(D) exemptions simultaneously in order to better provide
for his now-bankrupt family? 265 Courts have struggled with the possibility
of combining these two exemptions for the proceeds from one case of
personal injury, and contrasting rulings have resulted.
The majority of the courts hold that the § 522(d)(l 1)(E) and
§ 522(d)( l1)(D) exemptions can be stacked upon each other for a
compensation stemming from a single physical injury. 266 Thus, in In re
Lowery, 267 the court determined that the § 522(d)( l1)(E) exemption
contains only a single limitation, that the compensation be reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependants, and
268
therefore there is no restriction on combining it with other exemptions.
Yet, a minority of courts have ruled against the combination of the two
exemptions. In In re Russel12 69 the debtor tried to use both § 522(d)(11)(E)
and § 522(d)( 11)(D) to exempt a personal injury award stemming from a
single injurious incident. 2 70 The court ruled that "the debtor may not make
two separate exemptions with respect to a particular personal injury
264. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006).
265. See supra notes 191, 264.
266. See In re Basket, No. C07-5700RJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43995, at *9 (W.D.

Wash. June 2, 2008) (implying that a debtor could use both § 522(d)(1 1)(D) and
§ 522(d)(l1)(E) exemptions); In re Cramer, 130 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991)
(allowing the use of both the § 522(d)(1 1)(D) and § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemptions); see also In
re Lowery, No. 05-13536WHD, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3729, at *10 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 24,

2007) (listing a number of cases that hold that both exemptions can be used); id. at *9
(rejecting the argument that the word "or" in § 522(d)(1 1) suggests that the legislature
intended to allow the use of only one of the exemptions in a single case).
267. 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3729.
268. See id at *9 ("This interpretation does justice to the plain language of the statute and

also furthers the primary purpose of the exemption provisions, which is to ensure that
debtors leave the protection of the bankruptcy system with a 'fresh start' and do not become
a burden on the public."). "This result is consistent with the general rule that exemptions
should be construed liberally in favor of the debtor and furthers the primary purpose of the
exemption scheme." Id. at * 10; see also supra note 226.
269. 148 B.R. 564 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).

270. Id. at 565-66.
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judgment or settlement; the debtor must elect one exemption with regard to
that personal injury award."'27 1 A similar ruling in In re Howard,2 72
although based on a different rationale, stated that "because of the
conjunctive 'or' between subsections (D) and (E), a debtor is required to
elect between rather than stack the debtor's exemptions under these two
2 73
provisions.
III. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E): MAKE THE MOST OUT OF IT
Part II examined the divergent views of courts on the scope and
appropriate use of § 522(d)(1 1)(E). Part III of this Note synthesizes the
analyses included in Parts I and II to endorse a tolerant and permissive
approach for a consistent and effective utilization of the 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption. This Note proposes that a broad pro-debtor
interpretation of the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption is fully supported by the
historical progression of the law in a pro-debtor direction, 274 by the
underlying reasoning and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, 275 and by the
in-depth analyses of the conflicting rulings with regard to implementation
27 6
of specific aspects of this exemption.
A. The GradualPro-debtorTransformationof the Bankruptcy Code:
Ramificationsfor § 522(d)(11)(E)Implementation
When an accidental bodily injury occurs, as in the case of Joe the
Steelworker, the compensatory cost, which includes lost earnings, medical
bills, and mental suffering, may reach hundreds of thousands of dollars,
depending on the severity and duration of the injury. Therefore, a personal
injury victim is a strong candidate for a receipt of financial assistance. Yet,
creditors in bankruptcy cases claim the personal injury recoveries of over
1.5 million Americans each year. 277 An important, if not ironic, fact is that
illness or injury is the foundation for almost forty-seven percent of the
bankruptcy petitions. 278 Thus, an accident may lead to a bankruptcy filing,
which in turn may cause the redirection of the settlement pay to the
271. Id.at 566; see also Frank v. Herb (In re Herb), No. 1-08-bk-01 138, 2009 Bankr.
LEXIS 1656, at *3-4 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. June 18, 2009) ("Because § 522(d)(1 1) provides for

mutually exclusive options, the Debtors are left with no choice but to choose between
them.").
272. In re Howard, 169 B.R. 77, 81 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).

273. Id. at 81 n.4 (referencing the Georgia state statute equivalent to 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(1 1)(D) and 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E)).
274. See supra Part I.A.
275. See supra Part 1.B.
276. See supra Parts I.C., II.
277. See Joseph J. Blyskal, III, Levying Flesh and Charging Society, Creditors, and

Insurance Companies for It:

The Irony of Including Personal Injury Awards in the

Bankruptcy Estate, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 677, 678 (2007) (citing ELIZABETH WARREN
& JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS (4th ed. 200 1)).
278. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured. The Rhetorical
Significance, but PracticalIrrelevance, of Culpability andAbility To Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV.
229,236(2001).
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creditors, rather than to the unfortunate debtor, further increasing the
frustration and overall suffering of the likes of Joe and his family.
While social norms and bankruptcy laws have come a long way since
debtors were imprisoned, 279 sold into slavery, 2 80 or even forced to pay debts
with their own flesh, 28 1 a more liberal approach to the bankruptcy
exemptions is still necessary to reinforce the stated goal of a "true" fresh
start.2 82 The general purpose of the exemption laws is to protect a debtor
from harassment by creditors and to make available to him the basic
necessities of life such that, even if the creditors collect all of the
nonexempt assets, the debtor will not be left penniless at the expense of the
public .283

To effectively benefit a bankrupt debtor, the exemptions put in place by
Congress should be interpreted by the courts in a way that will ensure that
The 11 U.S.C.
their underlying objectives will be fully attained.
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption is a powerful and valuable tool that should not
be diminished by circumstances that may allow for a pro-creditor
interpretation of this statute. 2 84 This Note proposes that in a case in which
§ 522(d)(11)(E) is applicable, courts should exercise its pro-debtor power to
the fullest degree.
It should be emphasized that this Note's
recommendation is restricted to the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption. Inherently,
the bankruptcy exemptions, and § 522(d)( 1)(E) in particular, were
designed as a lifeline for the debtor's economic, social, and psychological
survival. 285 This Note's recommendation to enhance the effectiveness of
the § 522(d)( 1l)(E) exemption through a substantial liberalization in its
usage will not likely have significant repercussions on creditors' rights.
These rights are sufficiently safeguarded by other components of the
Bankruptcy Code and by the statute itself, which includes a significant
limitation on the exemption size, limiting it to what is "reasonably
2 86
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor."
A broad and flexible application of bankruptcy laws, especially the
exemptions, is in line with the historical progression of these laws in the
United States.2 87 For decades, the Bankruptcy Code has moved in a prodebtor direction, easing the restrictions on the application of discharge and
promoting a debtor-oriented structure for relief.28 8

The pro-debtor

transformation started with the advent of the bankruptcy discharge in

279. See supra notes 20, 25-26 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.

281. See supra note 23, 27 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 116.
283. See Clark v. O'Neill (In re Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087); see also supra
notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
285. See generallysupra Part I.C.
286. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E) (2006); see supra note 218 and accompanying text.
287. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E). See generally supra Part I.A.2.
288. See generallysupra Part I.A.2.
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1705,289 and gained further significance and focus through the Bankruptcy
Clause, 290 Congress's 1898 ratification of the Bankruptcy Act, 29 1 and the
massive reforms of 1978.292 In essence,293bankruptcy protection in the
United States has become an essential right.
Although a sizeable exemption may impinge on one of the major goals of
bankruptcy-reimbursing the creditors with what they are rightfully
owed 29 4-as a society we would be better off in erring on the side of the
debtor, and therefore courts should resolve complex bankruptcy
circumstances implying loss of future earnings by granting the relevant
exemptions. Such an approach would be in line with the general rule that
the bankruptcy exemptions should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
debtor. 295 Such a practice would also be in accordance with the major goals
and principles of the Bankruptcy Law and,29in6 particular, with the legislative
purpose of the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption.
Moreover, expansive pro-debtor implementation of § 522(d)(1 1)(E) will
also sustain the social 297 and economic 2 98 benefits of potential rehabilitation
of the debtor. Such benefits extend beyond the debtor's personal gains, as
they may protect the commonwealth from untoward social behavior. When
a bankrupt debtor is forced to give a large portion of a monetary settlement
to his creditors, he is likely to feel uncompensated for his suffering. Such a
perception of injustice may culminate in further social and economic strain
299
in the forms of unemployment, drug use, or even criminal behavior.
Furthermore, the sooner the debtor is relieved of his insolvency and
resumes reasonable functioning as a member of society, the better off the
30 0
economy as a whole will be.

289. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. While many of the amendments to
the original Bankruptcy Code and the 2005 reforms were pro-creditor, they aimed at limiting
access to debtors who are not truly worthy of bankruptcy protection. See FERRIELL &
JANGER, supra note 1, at 4.
294. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
295. See In re Lowery, No. 05-13536, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3729, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Sept. 24, 2007). In an overwhelming majority of bankruptcy cases, the U.S. trustee is the
one objecting to the use of an exemption, and an approach favoring the debtor would be in
line with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which provide that "the objecting party
has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed." FED. R. BANKR. P.
4003(c); see, e.g., In re Rockefeller, 100 B.R. 874, 877 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989); In re
Harris, 50 B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985); see also supra note 268.
296. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 140-43, 152-55 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
299. See Blyskal, supra note 277, at 683 n.55 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 10 (1993)); supra note 141 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (explaining that bankruptcy laws
enable efficient recovery of assets, which in turn reduces the risk faced by lenders and results
in cheaper lending practices); see also supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text
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An expansive reading seems particularly appropriate for the
§ 522(d)(11)(E) exemption, which inherently involves an injured, and often
severely injured, debtor. A combination of financial hardship and physical
injury will likely accentuate the psychological pressure on an already
downtrodden individual. The bankruptcy system in general, and the courts
the distress and anxiety that such a
in particular, should attempt to alleviate
30 1
debtor and his family are suffering.
The Bankruptcy Law has been featured as "evidence of man's humanity
to his fellow man." 30 2 The recommended pro-debtor emphasis in the
implementation of the § 522(d)(11)(E) exemption comports with this
characterization and reflects how far "humanity" has progressed with regard
to bankruptcy.
B. Curbingthe ConflictingApplications of§ 522(d)(1 1)(E)
A major goal of the Bankruptcy Law is to "relieve the honest debtor from
the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes." 303 When courts seek to help such an "honest debtor" secure a
feasible fresh start and put his life back in order, they should not limit his
30 4
prospect for a successful fresh start by avoidable technicalities.
Therefore, an exemption of a payment for "compensation of loss of future
earnings" 30 5 should not be restricted to compensation paid due to an
afflicted bodily injury. 306 Settlements stemming from disability payments,
wrongful termination, or discrimination suits should also be considered
30 7
compensation for loss of future earnings, and therefore exemptible.
Reading into the statute a requirement for bodily injury ignores the plain
wording of the statute. 308 Indeed, the distinction between loss of future
earnings due to bodily injury and loss of future earnings due to other
categories of injury was bluntly rejected by a court that could conceive no
societal interest in such an approach. 30 9 The proceeds from such
settlements usually play a significant role in sustaining the debtor's
livelihood and therefore should be exempted from the bankruptcy estate

(explaining that bankruptcy laws deal with the social and political turmoil created by a large
debtor class and reduce society's burden of financially supporting members of this group).
301. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (explaining that a fresh start can be
justified on moral and ethical grounds).
302. NOEL, supra note 14, at 200.

303. Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (citations omitted);
see supra notes 109-17.

304. See generally supra Part II (discussing the conflicts among courts with regard to
intrinsic details in the implementation of the § 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption).
305. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E) (2006).

306. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
308. See In re Carson, 82 B.R. 847, 856 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).

309. See id; see also supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
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pursuant to § 522(d)(1 1)(E). 3 10 Furthermore, one of the pro-debtor goals of
bankruptcy protection is to achieve an "effective rehabilitation" for the
debtor. 311 Limiting an exemption that enables a debtor to protect money
needed for reasonable support of his family by denying its use in workers'
compensation claims impedes such a rehabilitation process. 3 12
Even a liberal approach to § 522(d)( 11)(E) will not cause unreasonable
losses to creditors because of the explicit limitation in the statute that only
permits the exemption of what is "reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. '3 13 Yet, from the debtor's
perspective, a liberal application of this exemption may be self-defeating,
particularly in those cases where it will inevitably reduce the exempt
compensation to what is reasonably necessary for the debtor and his
dependents. Hence, in order to remain committed to the pro-debtor
foundation of the Bankruptcy Code, the court should give significant
consideration to the various exemptions provided by the Bankruptcy Code
and select the most appropriate one for a specific set of circumstances.
When confronted with a settlement that does not designate any specific
portion of the proceeds to loss of future earnings, courts should not hesitate
to allocate a reasonable amount towards future income. 314 This should be
done regardless of whether the interests of the debtor 3 15 or the creditors and
trustees are taken into account. 3 16 While a court may not be best equipped
with the exact financial formulas, it undoubtedly can make an educated
3 17
estimate.
Moreover, prohibiting the combined utilization of the § 522(d)( 1)(E)
exemption with the § 522(d)( 1)(D) exemption may hinder the debtor's
progress towards a new start. 3 18 Allowing for simultaneous use of the
§ 522(d)(11)(E) and § 522(d)(1 1)(D) exemptions "does justice to the plain
language of the statute and also furthers the primary purpose of the
310. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. When the court's goal is to set the
debtor on track for a fresh start "free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent
upon business misfortunes," the distinction between the various grounds of compensations
for loss of future income should not play a part. Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S.
549, 555 (1915); see supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
311. See H.R. REP. No. 89-687, at 2 (1965); supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 213-26 and accompanying text.
313. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(E) (2006). A two-part test is involved in the application of
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E): only after the court determines that an asset is a payment in compensation
for a loss of future earnings does it proceed to calculate whether and to what extent it is
reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor. See In re Rockefeller, 100 B.R. 874, 87779 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989); see supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
315. See In re Pless, 202 BR. 664, 667-68 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the
exemption was not granted because the court would not speculate on the exact portion of the
settlement that was meant to compensate for loss of future earnings).
316. See In re Cramer, 130 B.R. 193, 195-96 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that since
the court needed to speculate, the trustee did not meet his burden of proof, and, therefore, the
exemption was granted); supra notes 250-52.
317. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
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exemption provisions, which is to ensure that debtors leave the protection
of the bankruptcy system with a 'fresh start' and do not become a burden on
3 19
the public."
Notwithstanding the above recommendation to liberalize the use of the
§ 522(d)(1 1)(E) exemption, courts should not permit the inclusion of320a
payment that is intended to compensate for prepetition future earnings. 32 1
A bankruptcy court only has jurisdiction over a bankruptcy estate.
Permitting a debtor to exempt payments for prepetition income would
contradict the unambiguous intention of the statute. 322 However, when a
final ruling is delayed by a lengthy judicial process, the petition date rather
than the decision date should be the decisive factor. 323 Furthermore, the
court should factor in the inflation rate for the duration of the legal process.
A beleaguered debtor should not be faced with a further monetary loss
solely because it takes months and often years for a court to grant his
exemption.
In summation, any interpretation of the § 522(d)(11)(E) exemption that is
in line with the plain reading of the statute will also embrace a pro-debtor
attitude. Expansive and more consistent pro-debtor implementation of this
exemption will promote the humane foundation of the Bankruptcy Code,
facilitate a fresh start for a poverty-stricken debtor, and yield multiple social
and economic benefits to the involved parties and the community as a
whole.
CONCLUSION

Courts have disagreed on several vital issues concerning the 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(11)(E) exemption, ranging from the circumstances for its relevance
to the specific procedures inv'olved in its implementation. This Note
studied the historic progression and transformation of the Bankruptcy Code
and conducted an in-depth analysis of its underlying rationale and
principles. Consistent with these principles, interpreting the exemption in
favor of debtors should alleviate some of the confusion involved in its
application and increase the success rate of bankrupt debtors who try to
exempt a compensatory payment for their loss of future earnings from the
bankruptcy estate. Courts should invigorate the power of 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)( l1)(E) so that a debtor who has suffered through the double
misfortune of financial crisis and injury will be able to effectively use the
bankruptcy system to sustain his livelihood. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E) is a
319. In re Lowery, No. 05-13536, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3729, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept.
24, 2007). The § 522(d)(l 1)(D) exemption is capped at $20,200, whereas the
§ 522(d)(11)(E) exemption may be larger, provided that the money is reasonably necessary
for the support of the debtor and his dependents. Concomitant use of both exemptions may
result in a significantly increased compensation for the debtor.
320. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
321. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). An estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1).
322. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 227-45 and accompanying text.
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valuable tool that can help a debtor emerge robustly from bankruptcy and
become a productive member of society, thereby promoting the historical
goals of the bankruptcy laws.

